accepted initially with little opposition from newsmen, it was due at least in part to the fact that the censors were themselves drawn from the ranks of journalism, and were presumed to understand the temperament of journalists and the demands of their profession. This is not to say that censorship was imposed on the press without friction, or that all newspapers managed to avoid clashes with the censors. Several newspapers were fined for violation of censorship regulations during the war, but none became popular martyrs to the cause of freedom of the p r e s 3 Criticism of the censors was muted not only by the newspapers' agreement on the necessity of censorship, but also by their realization that ill-judged actions by the censors were due more to ignorance in the face of novel circumstances than any malicious desire to stifle the press. The problem of imposing censorship on the press in the event of war had occupied pre-war governments in desultory fashion for almost a decade before the outbreak of the ~o n f l i c t .~ Despite the pleas of military authorities for greater government initiative in planning for war, secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee 'during the years 1934-37, apart from some work we did in National Defence on censorship, the governmental machine, in this respect, appeared stolidly to stand at dead ~e n t r e . '~ In 1936, Dr. E.H. Coleman, the under-secretary of State, was asked to discuss the question of future censorship with representatives of the newspapers, and the Canadian Press wire service was asked to recommend personnel to staff the offices of the official censorship in time of war. A list of suitable names was provided to the government less than two weeks before hostilities began.6 A growing sense of urgency on the part of the government, however, may be seen in the formation of an interdepartmental committee to deal with the subject of wartime censorship, in March, 1938.' When war broke out in Europe, the press of Canada was subject to censorship under two different sets of regulations. The censorship regulations brought into force on 1.September 1939 had been drawn up by Colonel Pope at National Defence Headquarters8 and were based on regulations drafted by the Committee of Imperial Defence for use in the United Kingdom and the E m~i r e .~ Complaints of the severity of these regulations by editors and reporters led to their revocation the following January.lo
The permanent foundations of press censorship for the remainder of the war were the Defence of Canada Regulations established by order in council 3 September 1939, under the legislative authority of the War Measures Act." The pertinent sections of the DOCR, while outlining the limitations on the material to be published by the press, did not specify the procedures to be used in carrying out the business of cens~rship.'~ It was not until 13 August 1942 that the chief censor of publications had a clear definition of his powers -which were limited to declaring that publication of a certain piece of information was not a violation of the DOCR.I3 The censor had no power to punish errant publications: decision on whether or not a newspaper or magazine had violated the regulations was to be left to the courts.
For the first year of the war, the mechanism of censorship was an administrative mare's nest. Walter Thompson, publicity director for the Canadian National Railways, was named chief censor for Canada, and a Censorship Co-ordination Committee was set up with Thompson as its head.14 Separate press censors were appointed to examine English and French-language publications. Headquarters were in Ottawa, with a branch office in Montreal dealing mainly with French-language publications, and regional offices were established in Halifax, Toronto and Vanco~ver.'~ A proposal that a censor should be placed directly in the press gallery on Parliament Hill was quickly rejected.16 All overseas publications entering Canada, except for newspapers, were examined by the chief postal censor. For Canadian publications in languages other than English or French, a special publications examination branch was established.I7
From the outset, it was decided that the censors should be experienced newsmen, acceptable to the press in their respective regions. At the local level, the system worked satisfactorily: at the centre, however, there was considerable confusion over the authority and responsibilities of the censors. The Censorship Co-ordination Committee designated as the overall authority for the entire range of censorship activities met only once in that first year of war, and then only to consider a report made by Colonel Pope to the pre-war interdepartmental committee on cen~orship.'~ When Walter Thompson left for the Directorate of Public Information in December, 1939, Colonel Pope becamede facto(and absentee) headof censorship until May, 1942, when Colonel Oliver Mowat Biggar took over the post and brought some system of order into the administrative tangle of censorship. Biggar remained in office until January, 1944, when ill-health forced him to hand over his responsibilities to Wilfred Eggleston, who had been chiefpresscensor for English-language publications since early 1940.19 The Defence of Canada Regulations provided an initial, and very broad, outline of censorship requirements and duties. During the six years of war, the censors explained and expanded on the Regulations by means of some 200 directives issued to editors and publishers. Depending on the urgency of the case, directives were sent by mail, or by telegram followed by an explanatory letter. Because such directives often became obsolete through the changing circumstances of the war, there were ususally no more than 25 or 30 in effect at any given time.20 To keep editors abreast of the Regulations and their interpretations, the censors issued nine successive editions of the revised directives during the war.
Only one of the more than 100 daily newspapers published in Canada was suspended from publicaltion: the Toronto Clarion, a communist newspaper, was forced to cease publication in November, 1939.2' Eleven weekly and monthly foreign language publications were banned, mainly because they published communist propaganda, or opposed Canada's war effort. These usually reappeared under different names and were left undisturbed after the Soviet Union's entry in the war. Several newspapers were taken to court and fined for violations of the censorship regulations, but the penalties were light. The Vancouver Sun was fined $300 in 1942 for printing articles on West Coast defences after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Le Droir of Ottawa was fined $300 for an article critical of an Allied bombing raid on Paris, and Le Soleil of the Quebec City was fined $60 for premature disclosure of the sinking of an American steamer in December, 1944.22 One of the major problems faced by the Canadian censors during the first two years of the war lay in the fact that the United States was still neutral and the outpourings of its news media were not subject to wartime restrictions. As the first chief censor pointed out, trying to insulate Canada from propaganda sources in the United States was like trying to heat a Canadian house in winter if it had only three walls.23 There was nothing to prevent Axis information agencies reaching Canadian ears through American radio stations, even if it were possible to ban American publications from Canada outright, or place severe restrictions on cross-border travel by Canadians. To try to censor all incoming US publications would have been selfdefeating: such action would have generated a publicity momentum of its own. There were, on occasion, objections to material in popular American magazines which might be construed as harmful to the Canadian war effort, or to national unity." Public demands for the banning of these publications were resisted by thecensors,as occurred when the American economist, Eliot Janeway remarked in an article in Life magazine that the Canadian government was being 'blackmailed by the crudely pro-Axis French-Canadian minority (an ideal Nazi fifth-column).'25
The chief censor for English-language publications commented: Censorship over foreign news was made easier by the Canadian Press wire service's near-monopoly on news from overseas. CP had been involved in the pre-war discussions of the government's interdepartmental committee on censorship2' and had already shown its ability to shield Canadians from overseas news during the abdication crisis in 1936: Canada's wire servicesent out no despatches on the story to its subscribing newspapers, right up to the day of the king's radio broadcast announcing his abdication -nor did it send out any of the American Associated Press cables to which it was entitled by reciprocal agreement with AP.28
The Canadian Press took pains throughout the war to ensure that incoming news copy from foreign sources complied with the censorship regulation^.^^ Sensitive material was transmitted over the CP wire with the "slug" Holdfor CensorApproval. If approved by the censor, a message would be sent on the wire, authorizing member newspapers to run the story. If it was not approved, a "kill-note" was sent out to the teletypes. The wire services of the United States cooperated with the self-censorship of CP. Most of CP's foreign news came through the despatches of Associated Press correspondents and these, of course, were examined by CP before they went on the wire. However, many Canadian newspapers subscribed independently to other wire services, such as the International News Service, and the Chicago Daily News and the New York Times wire services. Their reports were fed directly to Canadian newspapers without scrutiny by an intermediate agency such as CP. These services, apprized of the Canadian censorship regulations, would slug doubtful stories Not for Publication in Canada.30 It wan inevitable, given the natural distaste of newsmen for restrictions on their work, that there would be loudcomplaints about the operations of the censors, even if censorship itself were recognized as necessary in a society at war with a ruthless and implacable enemy. In the confusion of the first year of the war, almost any action on the part of the censor could be criticized as heavy-handed and there were incidents in which the censor's decisions were, to put it charitably, inept. It is not easy for a democracy's press suddenly to deny its basic function and practice the arts of concealment at the command of government. There were occasions when the men at the top had little regard for the censorship which they claimed was indispensable to the winning of the war, and censorship rulings often flew in the face of military or bureaucratic ' inflexibility. Editors frequently complained of the ban on reporting troop movements, and the complaints came to a head when not even the Canadian government could maintain secrecy about the arrival of the Canadian First Division in Britain on 17 December 1939. The government had agreed to hold up announcement of the division's arrival for two days at the request of the Admiralty, and had notified the press accordingly. Both newsmen and cabinet ministers were taken aback when Winston Churchill broadcast the news on the day of the arrival."
The major cause celebre of Canadian press censorship in the war was the arrest and internment of Montreal's ebullient mayor, Camillien Houde, for counselling resistance to national registration. The arrest of the mayor led to the most serious criticism of the censors during the war, and served painfully to define their role as watchdogs of the press. On 21 June 1940, parliament passed the National Resources Mobilization Act. Although it gave the government extensive authority to direct manpower as it saw fit, the Act contained the reservation that such authority could not be used 'for the purpose of requiring persons to serve in the military, naval o r air forces outside of Canada and the territorial waters t h e r e~f . "~ In Quebec, however, many were unconvinced by this reassurance and saw the NRMA as the first crack in the federal government's solid pledge to avoid the imposition of conscription for overseas service. Among the doubters was Camillien Houde, who objected strongly to the use of Montreal municipal office buildings as centres for the registration of citizens under the NRMA. On 2 August, Mayor Houde made a public declaration of his opposition to national registration:
I declare myself peremptorily against national registration. It is unequivocally a measure of conscription, and the government recently elected last The events of the following week showed clearly both the anomalous position of the censors in a society accustomed to a free press, and the extreme caution with which the Liberal Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, had to pursue war policies which could never command the united support of the nation. While many Quebeckers volunteered for war service, the prevailing sentiment in the province remained much more isolationist than that in the English-speaking provinces. The conviction that Quebec had little or no vital interest in a European war had many articulate spokesmen, of whom Mayor Houde was one of the most prominent.
On the night of 5 August, Houde was arrested on a warrant signed by Ernest Lapointe, the federal minister of justice, and was sent to an internment camp, where he remained until August, 1944. In prime minister King's words the cabinet were virtually agreed that action be taken against Houde, and that immediately. The advisers in the Justice Department suggested Provincial Government taking action. Cardin rightly said 'Why should we place the burden on the Provincial Government? Why not the Federal Government? I asked him, in what manner, and he said by the R.C.M.P. He said action should be taken at once. Council then discussed whether Houde should be interned, or dealt with by the courts. It was agreed that, if brought before court, he would be given the opportunity he wanted, namely, speechify, making a display, etc. It was felt if he were interned at once, that would deprive him of this opportunity and would be most helpful in the end. It was agreed that the Mounted Police should take this action forthwith.
It was thought it had better be at night, as there would be no opportunity for photograph displays, etc. I can see, in the whole business, possibility of riots and serious difficulties throughout the Province of Quebec. However, I see no other course. The federal Government cannot afford to have its laws defied by one of Mayor Houde's p r~m i n e n c e .~~ Meanwhile, Houde's defiance of the government had created vast confusion in the offices of the censors. Shortly after Houde issued copies of his statement to the press, the chief censor issued a ruling that publishing the Mayor's remarks 'will probably constitute an offence under the Defence of Canada Reg~lations.'~~ The ruling came too late for the statement to be withdrawn from the 3 August first editions of the Montreal Gazette and the Toronto Globe and Mail, both of which ran stories on Mayor Houde and his statement on their front pages. From that moment both the newspapers and the censor found that their actions were public issues. Official wrath fell mainly on the Gazette, whose publisher, John Bassett, made a direct appeal to the appropriate cabinet ministers to permit him to publish the statement after it was withdrawn from later editions of his newspaper.
The first word received by the Gazette on the censor's policy in the matter came shortly after 9 p.m. freely quoted by ASK editors confine themselves to such statements in the ~o u s e . "~ Hanson's raising of the issue in the House took place too late for it to appear in most Canadian newspapers, which ran the story on the following Monday. The wire services, however, quickly flashed the story across the North American continent, and to Great Britain, where it was front-page news.43 As any journalist could have foretold, once a news story becomes public property, even for a moment, there is no stopping its further publication wherever newsmen detect sensation or scandal.
When parliament met on Monday, the Prime Minister scolded Hanson for repeating Houde's statement and criticized the press for giving the publicity the Mayor wanted: 'I think that when it was made any newspaper office that had seen it ought to have prevented its publication. Certainly, I think it was quite correct that the censor should ask that the statement be ~ensored.'~'
With editorial reaction against the Censor rapidly mounting, the 61st censorship directive of the war was sent out to clarify the official position. A paraphrase of it was sent out over the CP wires:
'Confidential -Not for Publication. Re. Houde: Editors may safely report factual development and carry editorial and outside cdmment provided offensive material is neither reproduced nor defended. Editors asked to refrain from material likely to aggravate harmful controversy between groups in Canada.'45
The overriding consideration in the minds of both government and censor was the avoidance of anything which might turn FrenchCanadian opinion against the war effort, and in particular against the National Resources Mobilization Act. It was one of the Prime Minister's distracting fears that Houde's arrest might give rise to serious civil disturbance in Quebec, and was the major consideration in arresting the Mayor in as secretive a manner as possible. In addition, King felt that the airing of the issue in the House of Commons was 'calculated to make trouble between the Government and the press, also to stir up trouble in Quebec.'46
The arrest of Houde did not immediately make him a martyr for Quebec's opposition to conscription, although it would not be long before he was considered so. French-language newspapers on the whole were quick to condemn his defiance of the federal g~vernment.~' L'Illustration Nouvelle went so far as to call him a political hoodlum and even the strongly nationaliste newspaper, Le Devoir, which was certainly no friend of the government or of the war effort, considered Houde to have overstepped the mark and to have , deserved his fate.48 English-language newspapers were unanimous in their condemnation of the Mayor. With equal unanimity, they rounded on the censors with a chorus of abuse, piling the scorn with admirable impartiality on the chiefs of the English and French censorship alike. The most stinging criticism came from the Ottawa Citizen in an editorial implying that the censors were traitors to their former profession: -Montreal's supreme demagogue, Mayor Houde, has received far more free publicity by the action of the press censors in Ottawa than would have been likely without press censorship ... ... in recent months the Canadian newpapers have been taking instuctions from Messrs. Eggleston and Charpentier. Known to fame as former members of the press gallery on Parliament Hill, they have been trying to carry ut the will of Prime Minister Mackenzie Kingincluding guidance to the Canadian press on editorial poli~y.'~ The Globe and Mail pointed out that inflammatory statements by prominent French-Canadians had not exactly been unknown during the First World War, and had not been subject to a censor's ban:
Such statements as that of the Mayor of Montreal were published throughout Canada during the Great War without interference by the press censors and it would be interesting to learn whether suppression of Mayor Houde's statement was ordered for political or military reasons. Since His Worship's outburst cannot be of the slightest assistance to the enemy, one is forced to the conclusion that the censor's decision was dictated by a foolish desire to protect the party in power. If a censor can thus muzzle the press, why cannot he go into the House of Commons and gag the Leader of the OppositionPo The Montreal Gazette, which had borne the greater burden of censorial disapproval, hit back at the censor on 5 August:
The Gazette was right in this instance and the censor hopelessly wrong. .. .Moreover the censor has succeeded only in defeating his own purpose. The news which he sought to suppress could not be and has not been suppressed. The public demand for it has been whetted, and the whole matter has become the subject of Parliamentary debate.
What we have had is a striking illustration of wrong and blundering action on the part of an official imbued with the concept of a totalitarian arbiter."
On the following day, the Gazette furnished its readers with a comprehensive account of the events a t the newspaper on the night of 2 August. In reply to the Prime Minister's claim that 'Any newspaper office that had seen it (the Houde statement) ought to have prevented its publication,' the Gazette protested:
This statement is strikingly illustrative of the handicaps newspapers are facing under the present censorship administration. At the present moment the Gazette has never received, from any one at any time, positive orders not t o print the Houde story o r comment thereupon. As for the Prime Minister's belief 'any newspaper office' should have suppressed the story on its own initiative, suffice it to say that this opinion was not shared by either the Gazette or the Globe and Mail, the only Canadian newspaper offices affected on Friday evening. The Gazette believed on Friday night, and it continues to believe, that publication of the story was in the public interest, and that no valid reason existed for its s u p p r e s s i~n .~~
For the first few days of the second week in August, editorial writers continued to make life miserable for the censors, accusing them of toadying to the government in a situation where truth and journalistic integrity were at stake.53 On 7 August, the chief censor explained his actions in a letter to the Canadian Press. The censor's duty, he pointed out, was to prevent the dissemination of statements and opinions which would exacerbate tensions between French-and English-Canadians. In the case of Carnillien Houde, he said, 'I am satisfied we were right in attempting t o prevent general circulation of Houde's appeal against registration until such time as the Government had been able to act. There is no doubt in my mind that if we had taken no steps about it, it would have been used in certain parts of Quebec t o work up resistance t o registration, and a great deal of harm might have been done....'54 Clearly, the censor's critics in the press had forgotten that he was no longer a newsman, but a civil servant charged with carrying out public policy, not criticizing it. As the Prime Minister noted in his diary, Mayor Houde's defiance of the federal government caused him 'more concern than anything which has happened thus far.'55 With the spectre of Canada's conscription crisis of 1917 before him, Mackenzie King had t o describe a very wary path through the minefield of French-Canadian sensibilities. In particular, the drafting of the National Resources Mobilization Bill in the summer of 1940 had involved him in an extensive campaign of sounding out French-Canadian opinion and employing his cabinet colleagues from Quebec to persuade their people that the measure posed no threat of conscription for overseas ser~ice.'~ It was in pursuit of this policy of maintaining French-Canadian support for the war that the censor had earlier that summer warned newspapers against printing material which might cause friction between English-and French-Canadians when the Royal Navy attacked French warships in their North African bases5' Shortly after Houde's arrest, the censor barred re-publication of material which had already been widely circulated eighteen months earlier: this was a speech made by the Mayor to a YMCA group in February 1939. In the course of his speech, Houde said: You appear to be surprised when I say the sympathies of the French-Canadian would be with Italy in the event of a war between that country and England. I would ask you to remember that the great majority of FrenchCanadians are Roman Catholic and the Pope is in Rome.
The French-Canadians don't want to go to war ... if war happens -and the possibility it may seems more probable every day -and Italy is in on one side and England on the other, the sympathy of the FrenchCanadians in Quebec will be on the side of Italy. We French-Canadians are not Latins, but Normans, but we have become Latinized over a long period of years. The Canadians are Fascists by blood, but not by name.58 Both government and censor had over-estimated the potential effect of Houde's statement against registration. Like most Canadians, Quebeckers had been jolted by the military success of the Nazis in the early summer of 1940. Public opinion, as the prominent Quebec nationalisre Andre Laurendeau later remarked 'itait ~r & t r e h subir n'importe q~o i . '~~ The victory of the Quebec Liberal party in the provincial election of October 1939, and the Liberals' federal victory in March 1940 had strengthened King's hand in Quebec. Almost two months before Houde's defiance of the federal government, a motion condemning the federal Mobilization bill was defeated in the Quebec Assembly by a vote of 56 to 13. 60 The Roman Catholic hierarchy in Quebec supported the federal government's policy of registration, and the press was muted by censorship. It was small wonder that popular opposition had little chance to find its voice. In the summer of 1940, the feelings of many Quebeckers were those of ambivalence, rather than outright opposition to the government's war policy. Many, like Laurendeau, believed that they were betraying themselves by registering, but they went ahead anyway: the powers of the state were too great to be resisted by individuals, however morally justified they may have felt. Besides, the morrow of France's collapse was no fit time to resist regi~tration.~'
The government miscalculated the effect of Houde's statement on the population of Quebec: the miscalculation was reflected in the censor's action on the night of 2 August and in the subsequent backtracking. As civil servants, the men who staffed the offices of the censorship had to support their political masters. Unlike most civil servants, however,the censors were in the direct line of fire from the newspapers. The criticism which would normally have been diverted at the cabinet minister responsible was diverted in large part to the inviting target presented by the censors. The criticism was made more acerbic by the censors' erstwhile status as journalists committed to the free dissemination of fact and opinion. Putting it baldly, the censors' burned their fingers on the Houde issue. On the night of 2 August, they went beyond the limit of the small portion of authority they possessed. They were fumbling in the dark for a consistent policy of censorship in the face of the strongly-entrenched free press tradition of Canadian journalism at a time when, paradoxically, the newspapers were themselves placing limits on that tradition 'for the duration.'
By ruling on the Houde statement before the newspapers submitted their stories on it, the censors ensured that they would incur the editorial wrath of the newspapers, whether or not the statement was actually subversive. They saw the issue in the same terms as their political superiors perceived it, and they tried to forestall its eruption as a cause c&bre in French Canada by first advising the suppression of news about Houde, then by warning the newspapers of the possible legal consequences of publishing such news. In the end, the news received more publicity than would have been the case had the censors not acted so precipitately. The censors initially failed to make the distinction between reporting the news and exploiting it, then backed away when the issue had received a parliamentary airing. As ex-journalists they should have known that once a news story receives a public airing, no power available to a democratic government can stop its spread. In the case of the Canadian press censorship, the Houde issue served as a salutary lesson in the limitations of censorship even in a society subject to the War Measures Act and the Defence of Canada Regulations.
The position of the censor -forced to make quick judgement in the midst of fast-changing circumstances -was scarcely calculated to satisfy all interested parties, no matter how wise his decisions may have been. In a letter to the acting head of the Censorship Coordination Committee, the chief censor for English-language publications outlined his conception of the censor's role:
Are the Press Censors 'in the middle', i.e., between the interests of security and the interests of morale? Perhaps 'in the middle' is an awkward phrasing of it, because it may suggest that we have only a detached academic interest in security which is certainly not the case. Would it not perhaps be more accurate to say that it is our duty to interpret certain phrases of the Defence of Canada regulations, such as 'information of value to the enemy'? ... The Press Censor has to 'draw the line'. That is really what I mean by being 'in the middle'. But 'drawing the line' involves weighing considerations. Practically everything printed has some small theoretical value to the enemy. This value must be weighed against the value to Canada and to the war effort of allowing it t o be published. In other words, the Press Censors in making any ruling must attempt to weigh security against other intangible^.^^ It was not until two years after the Houde incident that the censor received a clear definition of his powers under the DOCR, in Regulation 63A.63 In addition to the new regulation, the censor secured an agreement from the department of justice that no newspaper would be prosecuted for reporting in good faith a subversive statement made in public, provided the statement was neither supported nor exploited.64
If the censor's action in the Houde case aroused the newspapers to a realization of the DOCR's potential power over them, such a realization was rarely expressed with any vigour in their pages. There was no sustained press campaign against censorship or against the loss of civil liberties generally.65 Certainly, there were outbursts of editorial indignation against the censor as the war continued, but these outbursts were occasioned by specific incidents, not by moral or philosophical reservations about censorship in itself.66 The role of constant critic of the the DOCR and censorship remained with the small-circulation 'intellectual' periodicals, and even their criticism was often less than ~holehearted.~' Like the correspondents in the war zones, editors and reporters in Canada generally shared in the war aims of the Allied Powers and were willing to make accommodation with the exigencies of wartime conditions, even when such exigencies included limitations of freedom of e x p r e s s i~n .~~ The press in Canada reported on, and reflected the world around it. If the public was willing to put up with restrictions on civil liberties during time of war, the press was little inclined to get ahead of its readers.
FOOTNOTES +'
The author wishes to express his thanks to Professor Gordon 0. Rothney of the University of Manitoba for his helpful criticisms of an earlier draft of this article. (2) In any proceeding under these Regulations a certificate purporting to be signed by one of the Chief Censors of Publications that any matter therein set out or described was or was not passed for publication by them or by any person authorized toact on their behalf shall without proof of the signature beprima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Purcell October. 1940 . in which he allegedly gave away secret details of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (the details had been published without fuss in the FinancialPost more than two weeks previously); Col. George Drew's criticism of the royal commission of enquiry into the disaster which befell the Canadian Expeditionary Force to Hong Kong; and the desertion of large numbers of conscripted troops before their embarkation for Europe in December 1944. See Cook. passim for the most authoritative treatment of the role of Saturday Night, Canadian Forum and other 'intellectual' publications in criticizing the DOCR. Occasionally, such publications sympathized with the Censors, and even found occasion to praise them:
There is an inclination to attribute to the official censorship some of the shortcomings of the press. For this there is little justification. A perusal of the 'Directives' of the Censors discloses an attitude of sweet reasonableness, and one strikingly free of irritatingly useless restrictions. They confine themselves to their proper scope: that of preventing the leakage of information useful to the enemy. True,there have here and there been some stupid applications of the regulations,
